EU and UK inbound FDI regimes

January 2024  |  TALKINGPOINT | MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS

Financier Worldwide Magazine

January 2024 Issue

FW discusses EU and UK inbound FDI regimes with Morten Nissen, Stephan Waldheim, Janneke Kohlen, Anthony Rosen and Baptist Vleeshouwers at Bird & Bird.

FW: To what extent are you seeing the European Union (EU) and UK placing a greater focus on inbound investments? How would you characterise concerns around foreign companies investing in or acquiring EU and UK companies?

Waldheim: There has been a significant shift recently. Governments in the 90s and early 2000s favoured open markets, free trade and investments. However, factors such as China’s rising global commerce influence, increased digitalisation of the economy and society as a whole, the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, and Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine have dramatically altered this approach. Issues like potential energy weaponisation, the spread of fake news and competition over artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, semiconductors and advanced power modules have become national security matters. National governments have responded by tightening regulations on inbound investments, expanding the scope of foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes to capture additional security-sensitive or critical sectors. While FDI screening remains an issue for which national governments are competent, the EU adopted a central FDI screening mechanism in April 2020 that enables it to influence national decisions. In terms of targeted sectors, aerospace, defence, critical infrastructure and telecommunications remain focal points, but regimes have expanded to include strategic, geopolitical and foreign policy considerations such as supply chain resilience, strategic autonomy and the protection of open societies. Unlike merger control, FDI control has also become a highly political process, resulting in less predictability and increased uncertainty for investors.

Rosen: While the UK sits outside of the EU, similar considerations apply to the UK’s National Security and Investment Act (NSIA) regime, which created a mandatory notification regime for transactions for the first time – unlike UK merger control, which remains voluntary in contrast to most jurisdictions. The NSIA regime came into force in 2022 and the government has now had the opportunity to cast its eye over more than 1500 transactions. The UK remains open for investment, with the vast majority of deals cleared with little fanfare, however those investments involving sensitive areas such as semiconductors, AI, energy or investors from China or Russia have received close attention and some have even been blocked or made subject to remedies.

FW: How does the regime work in practice? Is it a central EU screening mechanism, or is the focus more on the national review processes carried out by member states?

Vleeshouwers: Generally speaking, the national FDI regimes in the EU member states and in the UK all follow the same mechanism: transactions which fall within the scope and meet certain thresholds will need to be notified to, and approved by, the relevant authorities before they can be implemented. At EU level, the EU FDI Screening Regulation offers a framework for governmental interaction and information exchange among EU member states, and the European Commission (EC) but the final decision rests with the national governments which must take account of the EU’s view in reaching its decision. Therefore, whether a transaction will have to be notified is primarily assessed at the national level. All EU member states and the UK have either adopted a screening mechanism or have expressed their intention to do so.

Waldheim: In practice, FDI is a national security screening mechanism, which means that each government can and has set different priorities. This means that even transactions with an EU-wide scope may have to be notified in some member states but not in others. For example, in Germany the regime applies not only to the usual suspects such as telecoms and defence, but may also apply to media, cloud computing and autonomous driving, to name just a few.

Vleeshouwers: The Belgian national system is similar to Germany’s in that the scope is limited to a number of strategic sectors. These include critical infrastructures, technologies and raw materials of essential importance to certain sectors, such as public health or public security, private security and technologies of strategic importance in the biotech sector or defence. The Flemish region has a distinct FDI regime that applies to all transactions involving foreign investors gaining control of public bodies. It does not require prior notification, but the Flemish government has the authority to intervene if strategic interests or vital processes in Flanders are threatened.

Kohlen: Also, the Netherlands has limited the field of application to specific sectors which it deems vital and hence the regime covers all direct investments into providers of ‘vital services’ and providers and owners of ‘sensitive and extremely sensitive technologies’, as well as operators of business campuses where such companies are located. The sensitive and extremely sensitive sectors have been identified and designated in special lower regulations. Perhaps most interestingly, the Dutch Investment, Mergers and Acquisitions Security Test (Vifo) Act does not distinguish between foreign and purely national transactions. Consequently, under certain conditions, acquisitions by Dutch investors in Dutch companies may be captured. This is a major difference compared to the regimes of most other EU member states.

Nissen: Denmark has adopted something of a hybrid system in the Danish Investment Screening Act (DISA). It has identified a number of particularly sensitive sectors or activities, in which prior approval of the Danish Business Authority is a mandatory requirement before parties are allowed to close the transaction or enter into the agreement. Outside of these areas, parties can still notify on a voluntary basis and are even invited to do so if certain conditions are met.

Rosen: In the UK, qualifying transactions or ‘trigger events’ that fall within the scope of one of 17 sensitive sectors – advanced materials, advanced robotics, AI, civil nuclear, communications, computing hardware, critical suppliers to government, cryptographic authentication, data infrastructure, defence, energy, military and dual-use, quantum technologies, satellite and space technologies, suppliers to the emergency services, synthetic biology and transport – are subject to a mandatory notification process and approval must be obtained prior to closing. The government can also ‘call in’ other deals for review for a period of up to five years and, accordingly, parties can also submit voluntary notifications for deals in other sectors, or for deals that do not meet the threshold for a mandatory notification if they desire certainty that the transaction will not be called in for review.

FW: Could you provide an overview of recent steps taken by the EU and UK to enhance their foreign direct investment (FDI) control mechanisms?

Waldheim: The German regime has been around long before the EU FDI Screening Regulation, but it has been amended over time to reflect EU requirements. The most recent amendment to the so-called Foreign Trade & Payments Ordinance (FTPO) entered into force in May 2021 and covers mainly emerging technologies such as AI, semiconductors, quantum, aerospace and nuclear technology. Interestingly, the latest update also captures concerns from start ups and financial investors, in that it raises the screening threshold. For traditional sectors, such as critical infrastructure, transactions by which a foreign investor acquires 10 percent or more of voting rights in the German target are captured. However, this was raised to 20 percent for emerging technologies, to avoid creating an undue burden for financial investors and start ups.

Kohlen: Historically, the Netherlands has enjoyed a significant inflow of FDI due to its open economy. However, the landscape has shifted in response to recent geopolitical challenges, prompting the introduction of the Vifo Act in June 2023. However, prior to this law, certain FDIs were already caught under certain sector-specific regulation, notably in the energy, mining and telecoms sectors. Under the Vifo Act, all qualifying investments with a retroactive effect to 8 September 2020 must be notified to the Investment Review Office, unless they were already covered by a notification regime provided for in sector-specific regulation, such as the telecoms and energy-specific regulation.

Vleeshouwers: Like the Netherlands, Belgium adopted its first national FDI screening regime quite recently, in July 2023. All investments signed after 1 July 2023 and covered by the FDI regime must be notified to, and approved by, the newly established Interfederal Screening Commission (ISC) before parties are allowed to close. The Flemish Screening Mechanism has been in force since 2018.

Nissen: Denmark has had an FDI screening regime since 2021. It applies to FDIs and special financial agreements, such as those agreements conferring the foreign contract party with a level of control over the Danish company, including supplier contracts or research and development (R&D) cooperation, initiated after 1 September 2021. Denmark’s enforcement efforts face challenges such as identifying what falls under the DISA and understanding the process of the authorities. As there is no publicly available case law, each assessment tends to be case-specific, often requiring dialogue with the authorities. However, many authorities are acknowledging these issues and recently revised the Act to improve transparency and procedure.

Rosen: The UK regime entered into force on 4 January 2022. This also includes a power for the government to retrospectively call in deals from 12 November 2020, if national security concerns are identified.

FW: What impact do you expect investment screening processes to have on inbound FDI aimed at the EU and UK?

Nissen: The EU’s implementation of FDI screening mechanisms is inevitably causing some concern among foreign investors. These mechanisms aim to bolster national security and protect vital industries but have also inadvertently introduced some level of uncertainty into the investment landscape.

Vleeshouwers: Looking at the EU as a whole, inbound EU FDI has been declining consistently since 2019. While this decrease aligns with the global FDI trend, it is more pronounced for inbound EU investment. Concurrently, there has been a substantial increase in the number of foreign transactions within the EU, encompassing both acquisitions and greenfield projects. The US and the UK continue to hold the foremost positions among foreign investors, whether through acquisitions or establishing new operations. Notably, in recent years, greenfield investments from offshore financial centres like Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands have displaced China from third position, moving it down to fifth spot. We anticipate that these trends are, in part, a result of heightened scrutiny of FDI within the EU. The increased scrutiny has made it more challenging for parties to assess FDI-related risks, potentially leading them to abandon the transaction. In addition, certain member states have established safe harbour thresholds for smaller transactions, which may have prompted parties to reduce their investment to avoid notification requirements. Finally, FDI screening processes are likely to further deter Chinese investments, as the EU FDI Screening Regulation takes into consideration whether the foreign investor is government-controlled, which is more prevalent in countries like China where the state has significant influence over business operations.

Kohlen: As it was introduced in June 2023, the exact impact of the Vifo Act on companies is uncertain at this stage. The Act details the categories of vital providers that fall under its purview, and we anticipate this will affect several dozen companies, mostly larger ones. However, it is important to note that startups deploying sensitive technologies will also be subject to the Act, even though fewer SMEs are expected to be impacted. With the introduction of the Vifo Act, transaction costs are likely to rise due to the additional layer of scrutiny and potential delays in the implementation process. This increased screening could introduce an element of uncertainty for both the acquiring and target companies, potentially affecting investment decisions and strategies. Investors from countries currently caught up in geopolitical tensions may face the most significant hurdles, especially if they are state-owned or state-controlled. This could affect the ease and speed with which such investments are approved under the new screening process. Considering the Netherlands as traditionally an open economy, the introduction of the Vifo Act represents a delicate balancing act. The government will have to weigh the potential effects on the investment climate against the need for increased security and control of foreign investments. This requires careful consideration of the proportionality of the Act’s implementation to ensure that the country maintains its attractiveness as an investment destination while safeguarding its strategic interests.

Nissen: In Denmark, the implementation of FDI screening processes resulted in the first transaction being blocked. However, the Danish Act does not require the authorities to explain the reason behind their decision, which leaves the parties involved in the dark. This lack of transparency could potentially discourage foreign investors from selecting Danish targets. The intricate approval process adds to this confusion, which is not just confined to Denmark but is a concern for the broader EU investment market as well. Maintaining a balance between security concerns and fostering an attractive investment climate is essential. We need to build trust with potential investors through transparent and consistent screening processes. Achieving this balance is key to both ensuring security and promoting economic growth.

Rosen: In the UK, investors can expect close scrutiny of deals. If there are investors, typically shareholders above 5 percent, from China, Russia and other similar countries, then the parties will need to err on the side of caution and manage any engagement carefully. Of the 65 deals announced over the last year that were called in for review, 42 percent of them involved Chinese investors. This positioning is aligned with increasing focus on critical infrastructure and the UK telecoms security and cyber security regimes which address certain Chinese high-risk suppliers as well as seeking to improve supply chain resilience, respectively. The NSIA regime is administered by the Investment Screening Unit (ISU) which sits with the Cabinet Office. This proximity to the prime minister could result in greater political influence over the review process. While very few transactions have been blocked, the regime is unfortunately, like in Denmark, a little opaque given the national security interests in question. This will undoubtedly make it more difficult for parties to assess transaction risks in advance.

FW: What types of investors and investments are likely to be subject to review under EU and UK regimes? What are the similarities and differences between these jurisdictional approaches?

Vleeshouwers: This is really where the lack of a harmonised system within the EU starts to sting, as there is quite a divergence between the member states as to which investors and investments fall within the scope of the review mechanisms. Belgium’s FDI screening mechanism, for example, focuses solely on non-EU investors, differentiating it from other EU member states like France, Germany and the Netherlands, which can, under certain circumstances, also cover EU investors or, conversely, restrict screening to non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) investors, as seen in Poland. The Belgian framework notably also does not cover greenfield operations, contrary to other jurisdictions. Furthermore, typically only transactions meeting certain thresholds require prior notification and approval, but the thresholds are not harmonised at EU level. In Belgium, these thresholds, set between 10 to 25 percent of voting rights, depend on the sector in which the Belgian target operates. For the biotech and defence sectors, a dual threshold exists, triggering notification obligations only if the target also generates certain turnover alongside the voting rights thresholds. Transactions meeting these thresholds need to be reported to the ISC. Although it remains to be seen how the authority will apply the rules in practice, we cannot exclude the possibility that, due to certain ambiguities in the texts and Belgium’s complex institutional setup, an unexpectedly large number of transactions could require notification in Belgium.

Waldheim: In Germany, there are two investment review tracks. The first, known as the cross-sectoral review, only applies to investments by non-EU or non- European Free Trade Association (EFTA) investors into a German target active in one of the 27 sectors which the FTPO considers likely to have an effect on public order or security. The second, the sector-specific review, also applies to EU and EFTA investors, but only if they are investing in military and defence, IT security or goods listed on the export control list. Both systems can be triggered by as little as a 10 percent stake in a German target, encompassing acquisitions of shares, assets or voting rights. It is worth noting that, unlike from merger control measures, even intragroup restructurings can be caught and the list of sectors likely to have an effect on public order or security in the FTPO is non-exhaustive, meaning the German government retains the right to investigate and even reverse an investment considered security-relevant for up to five years after closing, even if it falls outside this catalogue. As such, we typically recommend seeking a ‘certificate of non-objection’ from the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BKMW), to ensure deal security when there is any uncertainty.

Nissen: In Denmark, the overall aim of the review is to determine whether the investment or special financial agreement could pose a threat to national security or public order. According to the text of the DISA, the authority’s analysis will include asking, among other things, whether the investor is owned by foreign government agencies or foreign armed forces, whether the foreign investor has been involved in activities affecting security or public order in an EU member state or in other friendly and allied countries, and whether there is a serious risk that the foreign investor will engage in or has relationships with illegal or criminal activities significant to national security or public order. However, the DISA provides very limited additional information on the specific factors under review. Since the decisions are not made public, parties involved have minimal insight into the authority’s considerations.

Kohlen: The screening mechanism for FDI in the Netherlands does not differentiate between investors based on their origin, applying to both Dutch and foreign investors. This distinguishes the Dutch regime from many other jurisdictions. Transactions surpassing certain thresholds must be reported to the Bureau for Verification of Investments (BTI), the body in control of FDI notifications. Given the definitions outlined in the Vifo Act, it is likely that this will apply primarily to larger companies or startups dealing with sensitive technologies. Therefore, investors that choose to invest in these companies will likely fall under the jurisdiction of the Vifo Act.

Rosen: The UK’s regime is quite broad, encompassing several qualifying transactions. For the mandatory notification regime, transactions that involve an acquisition of voting rights or shares in a UK-based target that exceed the 25, 50 or 75 percent thresholds are covered. Additionally, acquisitions of voting rights that allow the investor to control the target’s corporate resolutions are also captured. Importantly, this can also apply to corporate restructurings or reorganisations within the same corporate group. Additionally, acquisitions of assets or of so-called ‘material influence’ also fall under the regime, even if the voting right and shareholding thresholds are not met. Those transactions are only subject to voluntary notifications, however. Sales in the UK alone are not sufficient to trigger a mandatory notification. When reviewing the transaction, the government will evaluate three primary risks, those associated with the acquirer, based on nationality, ownership and other activities, the target, based on the nature of operations, and the level of control, based on the nature of control acquired.

FW: What are the main challenges facing foreign entities seeking approval for their investments into the EU or UK?

Waldheim: Determining whether a transaction requires notification under the national regimes in the EU presents a significant challenge. The laws are often vague and the triggers for government intervention could be politically driven, with each government following its own agenda. Additionally, for certain transactions, technical expertise in areas like chemical or manufacturing processes may be necessary to ascertain if the transaction falls within scope. Another hurdle is accounting for the uncertain FDI process in the transaction documents. Most jurisdictions have two phases of investigation, with varying timelines, and in some countries, such as Germany, a transaction can be deemed cleared if the authority fails to take a decision within a set time-period. These scenarios need to be adequately addressed in the conditions precedent and could lead to further negotiation on points including long-stop dates and ‘hell and high-water’ clauses, among others. Finally, timing can also be a concern, especially if the transaction undergoes a phase two in-depth investigation.

Rosen: It is absolutely critical for investors to keep the FDI regime at the forefront of their considerations. In the UK, if a mandatory notification is necessary, it is important to allow ample time for clearance. This includes a minimum of 30 working days post-notification for the initial review. If the deal is subsequently called in, an additional 30 working days are required, which can be extended by another 45 working days, and potentially even longer if mutually agreed by the parties. Essentially, for certain deals, up to 105 working days may need to be allotted for review. For transactions involving sensitive government or defence contracts, we recommend proactive engagement wherever possible to try to streamline the process. Parties should also think about relevant conditions precedent, much like they would in merger control. Given the potential for criminal liability or fines in case of failure to notify a mandatory deal, we advise exercising caution and erring on the side of notification if there is any uncertainty.

FW: Are there standstill obligations in place? How would they relate to parallel regulatory filings, such as merger control filings, for example?

Vleeshouwers: In Belgium, a standstill obligation akin to merger filings or foreign subsidy notifications applies, requiring approval from the ISC before completing the transaction. However, the process for securing approval from the ISC for FDI screening, from the Belgian Competition Authority for merger control, or from the EC for merger control or foreign subsidies, varies significantly. Consequently, parties may find the timeframes for various notification procedures misaligned.

Waldheim: Germany also implements a standstill obligation. The waiting periods are two months from filing for phase one investigations and can extend up to an additional eight months for phase two in-depth investigations. Like merger control, the government has the ability to pause the clock until the parties have responded to information requests. However, unlike merger control, a transaction can close before obtaining FDI clearance in Germany, meaning the transfer of shares will be legally valid. But in such cases the investor must refrain from exercising the acquired voting rights before obtaining FDI clearance. There is an exception to the standstill obligation for atypical acquisitions of control like veto rights on management appointments or budget issues. However, we generally advise that parties avoid relying on this exception if they are active in a sensitive sector. In such cases, it is advisable to petition the BKMW for an informal notice. The practical task of gathering all necessary data is reasonably manageable, and in return investors receive deal security.

Kohlen: Like in Belgium, the Dutch regime includes a standstill obligation for merger filings or foreign subsidy notifications. The process for securing BTI approval for FDI screening also differs significantly from the filings under competition law or for foreign subsidies. The standstill obligation starts as soon as the investment needs to be filed with the BTI. The obligation to file rests with the investors as well as the target company. If parties do not respect the standstill obligation, gun-jumping fines may be imposed.

Rosen: If a deal is subject to a mandatory NSIA notification it cannot be closed without approval. This is different to merger control in the UK, where there is no standstill obligation, given the voluntary nature of the notification regime, but the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) can impose interim measures to prevent pre-emptive steps.

FW: What advice would you offer to foreign acquirers on dealing with regulatory authorities when pursuing targets in the EU and UK? What preparations should they consider to optimise their chances of navigating a review process?

Nissen: For foreign buyers interested in targets within the EU and UK, our advice would be to assess whether the target’s activities fall under national regulations for foreign investment screening at the earliest possible stage of the process. This will help to initiate the filing process promptly. Internally, investors should maintain a clear overview of the ultimate owner making the investment. This simplifies the initial assessment, allowing the focus to shift to more critical aspects of the process.

Rosen: It is important to consider whether the target falls within any of the 17 sensitive mandatory sectors early on. As the responsibility lies with the buyer, conducting appropriate due diligence is crucial to prevent unforeseen complications or delays. Lastly, it is crucial to engage FDI specialists early in the process. The required approvals will need to be addressed in the transaction documents, for example in the conditions precedent. We often see parties reaching out at the end of negotiations when there is little room for renegotiation. Early involvement of specialists can save both time and resources.

FW: What further developments do you expect to see with regard to FDI in the years ahead? What issues and themes are likely to shape investment flows?

Vleeshouwers: Many EU member states have only recently implemented their initial FDI screening mechanisms, and it is expected that there will be some initial challenges in both their application at the national level and in coordinating efforts between member states and the EU. Following this transitional phase, we anticipate several significant developments in FDI screening. First, we anticipate that the remainder of the EU member states will establish their national FDI screening frameworks. Furthermore, it is expected that the EU will continue its harmonisation efforts, aiming further to align FDI screening mechanisms across member states. While some opposition is to be expected from national governments we believe further streamlining of processes and assessment criteria would benefit foreign investors as it would decrease the complexity of assessing FDI-related risks for inbound investments. Moreover, member states are likely to broaden the scope of their FDI screening mechanisms, encompassing an ever-wider range of sectors, particularly those relevant to emerging technologies, sensitive data and life sciences, including healthcare. Finally, there is likely to be increased scrutiny of investments made by state-owned enterprises, particularly those associated with countries wielding substantial government influence over businesses.

Kohlen: As the Dutch regime has only recently been implemented, we anticipate that the authorities will concentrate on enhancing the screening mechanism in the coming years. Given the Netherlands’ history of maintaining an open economy, we expect there will be some initial challenges to navigate, which may take some time to resolve. Depending on the shifts in the geopolitical landscape, the Netherlands may also expand the scope of its screening mechanism. For example, it might investigate other sectors like healthcare and life sciences.

Nissen: Considering current global trends, it is increasingly apparent that we are likely to see more actions with potential implications for national security in the future. As we look ahead, there is growing pressure on EU and national regulators to ensure they provide thorough supervision over individuals and entities that have access to critical infrastructure and other essential parts of our society. This emerging focus on security parallels the substantial advancements made in areas such as data protection, underlining the importance of providing oversight and protection in our rapidly changing world.

Rosen: The UK’s NSIA regime is still bedding in but to date there have only been five prohibited deals out of over 1500 notifications. Only 10 deals have needed remedies, such as information barriers, restrictions on non-UK control, obligations to maintain UK capabilities, information security measures, and government-approved operators. In line with the latest government report on the NSIA regime, published in July 2023, we would agree that the regime is a “light touch, proportionate regime that offers companies and investors the certainty they need to do business, while crucially protecting the UK’s national security in an increasingly volatile world”. Notwithstanding this, the UK government has just begun a review to consider ways to improve processes and revisit some of the sensitive sectors and transactions in scope, such as corporate restructuring. Finally, the UK and US governments are keen to prevent companies’ capital and expertise from fuelling technological advances in countries of concern. The UK government is working with industry to assess the potential national security risk posed by outward direct investment sitting alongside export control regimes covering sensitive technology transfers and sanctions.

Waldheim: Looking beyond inbound FDI screening, we also anticipate a growing trend toward regulating outbound investments. As global economies continue to evolve and become more interconnected, countries may seek to monitor and control not only incoming investments but also the outbound ones to ensure that strategic assets, know-how and technology do not fall into the hands of foreign entities that may pose a risk to national security. Governments are keen to prevent companies’ capital and expertise from fuelling technological advances in countries of concern. It is a complex and dynamic field. We are nowhere near the restrictions imposed on investments by the US CHIPS & Science Act yet, but the political debate over outbound FDI has begun and we expect the regulatory landscape to continue to change in the coming years.

Morten Nissen co-heads Bird & Bird’s international competition and EU law group and leads the competition and EU team in Denmark. With over 12 years of experience in Brussels, his expertise includes merger control, state aid, competition restricting agreements, abuse of dominance, foreign direct investment and foreign subsidies control. He is also a non-governmental adviser to the Danish Competition Authority. He can be contacted on +45 27 59 32 04 or by email: morten.nissen@twobirds.com.

Stephan Waldheim is a partner based in Germany, specialising in corporate and commercial transactions. Having handled over 20 cases in the last two years, he is one of Germany’s leading experts in foreign direct investment. His practice centres around tech transactions with a focus on digital infrastructures, telecommunications and mobility. He is a member of ‘Forum Investment Control’, Berlin. He can be contacted on +49 211 2005 6167 or by email: stephan.waldheim@twobirds.com.

Janneke Kohlen is a partner based in the Netherlands, specialising in competition and public procurement law. She has extensive experience in merger control, foreign direct investment, cartels and abuse of dominance cases, advising clients on contentious and non-contentious matters. She is a member of Dutch Associations for Competition Law and Public Procurement Law, and co-editor of a Dutch legal journal. She can be contacted on +31 70 353 88 46 or by email: janneke.kohlen@twobirds.com.

Anthony Rosen is a legal director in Bird & Bird’s regulatory and competition team in London, specialising in competition, foreign direct investment and telecommunications. His experience includes working at a leading tech company and communications regulator, enabling him to develop a comprehensive understanding of the regulatory landscape to assist clients across the spectrum of regulatory compliance, investigations and transactions. He can be contacted on +44 (0)20 7905 6243 or by email: anthony.rosen@twobirds.com.

As counsel in Bird & Bird’s competition and EU law practice in Brussels, Baptist Vleeshouwers advises clients on EU and Belgian competition and trade law, including state aid, merger control and foreign direct investment. Representing clients before the Belgian Competition Authority, the European Commission and the courts in Luxembourg, his experience includes assisting clients navigating notification processes in Belgium and at EU level. He can be contacted on +32 2 282 6061 or by email: baptist.vleeshouwers@twobirds.com.

© Financier Worldwide

THE PANELLISTS

Morten Nissen

Stephan Waldheim

Janneke Kohlen

Anthony Rosen

Baptist Vleeshouwers

Bird & Bird